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Eliminate State Tax on Trust Income:
A Comprehensive Update on Planning With
Incomplete Gift Non-Grantor Trusts
Kevin R. Ghassomian, Esq.*
Private letter rulings dating back to 2001 affirm various tax attributes of
incomplete gift non-grantor trusts, known popularly as “DING Trusts,”
which have been used by taxpayers to relocate investments from high-tax
states to no-tax states. In 2007, the Internal Revenue Service questioned
the integrity of its rulings on the DING Trust and cast doubt on its continuing viability for tax planning purposes. After nearly six years of indecision, a flurry of favorable new rulings was released in March of 2013,
restoring widespread confidence in the DING Trust as an option for taxpayers seeking relief from rising income tax rates. This article examines
the DING Trust within the context of the new rulings and recent case law,
suggesting structural safeguards and recommendations for most effectively employing the technique to mitigate income tax liability at state and
local levels.
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INTRODUCTION
The top federal tax rate on long-term capital gains increased from
15% in 2012 to 23.8% in 2013 due to a combination of higher income tax
rates1 and a new 3.8% tax on investment income.2 When including state
and local taxes, the top marginal effective tax rate on capital gains in the
United States now averages 27.9%.3 Compared to other developed
1 Under the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 (“ATRA”), long-term capital
gains and qualified dividends will be taxed at 20% for households with taxable income
exceeding $400,000 for individuals, $450,000 for married couples filing jointly, and
$425,000 for heads of households. Pub. L. No. 112-240, 126 Stat. 2313 (2013). See also
I.R.C. Reg. § 1(h).
2 The 3.8% tax enacted under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
(“Affordable Care Act”), not as part of ATRA, applies to net investment income if the
taxpayer’s adjusted gross income exceeds $250,000 for joint filers or $200,000 for single
filers. Pub. L. No. 111–148, 124 Stat. 119–1025 (2010). The 3.8% tax also applies to the
undistributed net investment income of trusts in excess of $11,950 in 2013. Id. See also
I.R.C. Reg. § 1411.
3 A marginal effective tax rate includes federal income taxes, state income taxes,
local income taxes (here approximated as weighted averages across the state), federal
Medicare taxes including those in the Affordable Care Act, and the interaction between
taxes for deductibility purposes. See Kyle E. Pomerleau, Fiscal Fact No. 362: The High
Burden of State and Federal Capital Gains Taxes, TAX FOUNDATION, Feb. 20, 2013, http://
taxfoundation.org/?sites/?taxfoundation.org/?files/?docs/?ff362.pdf (citing Gerald Prante
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countries, which average 16.4%, seven of the ten highest capital gains
rates are found in U.S. states.4 In fact, California’s aggregate effective
rate of 33% is the second highest capital gains rate in the world, higher
than those of France, Finland, and Sweden.5 New York ranks fifth in
the world with a rate of 31.4%.6
Yet, within the U.S., there is great variability with respect to capital
gains rates among the states, with many having no income tax at all.7
Thus, Private Letter Rulings 201310002 through 201310006 (“2013
PLRs”), issued by the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) in March of
2013,8 were welcomed by taxpayers, as they ended a near six-year hiatus
on private letter rulings (“rulings” or “PLRs”) involving incomplete gift
non-grantor trusts, a tax planning technique known popularly as the
“DING Trust.”9 The 2013 PLRs provide continuity with a prior line of
IRS rulings that affirm the regulatory treatment of the DING Trust and
effectively approve, as its key to tax savings, a means by which taxpayers
can migrate investments from high tax states to low-tax or no-tax
states.10
The success of the technique, as set forth in the PLRs, depends on
the taxpayer’s ability to relinquish enough control over the trust to
avoid grantor trust status for income tax purposes but not enough for
transfers to the trust to be deemed completed gifts for gift tax purposes.
& Austin John, Top Marginal Effective Tax Rates by State and by Source of Income, 2012
Tax Law vs. 2013 Scheduled Tax Law (as enacted in ATRA), Feb. 2013, available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/?sol3/?papers.cfm?abstract_id=2176526).
4 Id.
5 Id.; see also Richard Morrison, U.S. Now Has Some of the World’s Highest Capital
Gains Tax Rates, THE HEARTLAND INSTITUTE, Feb. 13, 2013, http://news.heartland.org/?
newspaper-article/?2013/?02/?20/?us-now-has-some-worlds-highest-capital-gains-taxrates.
6 See Pomerleau, supra note 3.
7 Id. at 2, 5 (citing Table 1 which notes the states that do not tax capital gains).
8 PLR 201310002 (Nov. 7, 2012); PLR 201310003 (Nov. 7, 2012); PLR 201310004
(Nov. 7, 2012); PLR 201310005 (Nov. 7, 2012); PLR 201310006 (Nov. 7, 2012).
9 Although incomplete gift non-grantor trusts can be settled in any jurisdiction that
permits irrevocable self-settled spendthrift trusts, advisors in Delaware took the early
lead in marketing such trusts for state income tax planning purposes; thus, they are
widely known as “Delaware Incomplete Gift Non-Grantor Trusts” or “DING Trusts.”
10 In March of 2014, the IRS released ten additional DING Trust rulings, affirming
its reasoning in the 2013 PLRs and approving the settlor’s appointment of guardians to
act on behalf of minors on the trust’s distribution committee. PLR 201410001 (Oct. 21,
2013); PLR 201410002 (Oct. 21, 2013); PLR 201410003 (Oct. 21, 2013); PLR 201410004
(Oct. 21, 2013); PLR 201410005 (Oct. 21, 2013); PLR 201410006 (Oct. 21, 2013); PLR
201410007 (Oct. 21, 2013); PLR 201410008 (Oct. 21, 2013); PLR 201410009 (Oct. 21,
2013); PLR 201410010 (Oct. 21, 2013) Five more favorable DING Trust rulings were
released in July of 2014, PLR 201430003 (Jul. 25, 2014); PLR 201430004 (Jul. 25, 2014);
PLR 201430005 (Jul. 25, 2014); PLR 201430006 (Jul. 25, 2014); and PLR 201430007 (Jul.
25, 2014).
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Threading this regulatory needle requires an overtly contrived trust
structure that is best explained within the context of the 2013 PLRs.
This article, therefore, begins with the facts of PLR 201310002, which
are representative of the rest of the 2013 PLRs.11 The article follows
with an explanation of the DING Trust’s operative requirements and
concludes with a summary of its benefits and recommendations for
those who may implement the strategy.
I. FACTS

OF

PRIVATE LETTER RULING 201310002

The taxpayer, a resident of New Jersey, transferred investment assets to an irrevocable spendthrift trust settled in Nevada.12 The beneficiaries of the trust included the taxpayer and his descendants; but
distributions to them by the trustee, an independent corporate fiduciary
in Nevada, were subject to the authority of a committee (“Distribution
Committee”).13 The members of the Distribution Committee, initially
the settlor and his four sons, maintained the power to direct income and
principal among themselves and other trust beneficiaries in two ways:
(1) by majority agreement with the settlor’s consent (“Settlor’s Consent
Power”) or (2) by unanimous agreement without the settlor’s consent
(“Unanimous Member Power”).14
In addition, the settlor retained two controls over the trust assets:
(1) a non-fiduciary lifetime power to make distributions of principal for
the health, education, maintenance, and support of the settlor’s issue
(“Settlor’s Sole Power”) and (2) a testamentary power to appoint the
remaining balance of the trust to anyone other than the settlor’s estate,
his creditors, or the creditors of his estate (“Settlor’s Testamentary
Power”).15 Trust distributions could be made equally among the beneficiaries or to any one or more of them to the exclusion of others, and any
undistributed income was to be accumulated and added to principal.16
11 The 2013 PLRs were issued to separate taxpayers within one family who were all
beneficiaries of the same trust; so, the facts and rulings in each PLR are virtually identical. This article will, therefore, reference the 2013 PLRs interchangeably with PLR
201310002.
12 William D. Lipkind & Steven J. Oshins, The Ultimate Estate Planner, Inc.,
Teleconference Presentation: The NING Trust: Saving Significant State Income Taxes for
Your Clients in High Income Tax Jurisdictions (May 2, 2013) [hereinafter Lipkind &
Oshins, Teleconference] (confirming that the state of the settlor’s domicile was New
Jersey and the state in which the trust was settled was Nevada).
13 PLR 201310002 (Nov. 7, 2012).
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 Id.
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At the settlor’s death, the trust’s unappointed balance was to be distributed among the settlor’s descendants in further trust.17
The Distribution Committee, which would terminate at the settlor’s
death, could only be comprised of trust beneficiaries and was required
at all times to have at least two members serving, neither of whom could
be the settlor.18 Consequently, the Distribution Committee also was to
cease when there were fewer than two eligible members serving, even if
the settlor was also then serving. Though not explicit in the ruling, departing Distribution Committee members would not be replaced automatically unless a replacement was needed to maintain the two-member
minimum.19
II. TAX ISSUES

AND

RELATED TRUST REQUIREMENTS

The complexity of the DING Trust’s operating structure, evident in
PLR 201310002, is a result of the gauntlet of tax authority that confronts
it. First, the taxpayer who settles the trust must be domiciled in a jurisdiction that will not tax the accumulated income or capital gains of an
out-of-state non-grantor trust. Second, the trust must avoid grantor
trust status so that its income is taxed to the trust rather than to the
settlor. Third, the taxpayer’s transfer of assets to the trust must be incomplete for gift tax purposes so that the conveyance settling the trust is
not taxable. Finally, the members of the distribution committee must
not hold controls that could be deemed general powers of appointment;
otherwise, any assets subject to such controls would be includible in the
estates of the committee members and taxed accordingly.
17

Id.
“[The] Trust provides that at all times at least two ‘Eligible Individuals’ must be
members of the Distribution Committee. An ‘Eligible Individual’ means a member of
the class consisting of the adult issue of Grantor, the parent of a minor issue of Grantor,
and the legal guardian of a minor issue of Grantor. A vacancy on the Distribution Committee must be filled by the eldest of Grantor’s adult issue other than any issue already
serving as a member of the Distribution Committee, or if none of Grantor’s issue not
already serving as a member of the Distribution Committee is an adult, then the legal
guardian of the eldest minor issue shall serve, or if such minor issue does not have a legal
guardian, then the parent of such minor issue. If at any time fewer than two Eligible
Individuals are members of the committee, the Distribution Committee shall be deemed
not to exist.” Id.
19 This fact can be inferred from the ruling’s analysis addressing a regulatory example in which the death of one member of a group enhanced the power of each remaining
group member. Id. It was also confirmed by William Lipkind, the attorney who secured
the 2013 PLRs. William D. Lipkind, Bill Lipkind on PLR 201310002: DING Redux,
LEIMBERG INFO. SERVICES, INC. EST. PLAN. NEWSL. #2076, Mar. 12, 2013, available at
http://www.leimbergservices.com/?openfile.cfm??filename=D%?3A%?5Cinetpub%?5C
wwwroot%?5Call%?5Clis%?5Fnotw%?5F2076%?2Ehtml [hereinafter Lipkind, DING
Redux].
18
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A. Settlor’s Domicile Must Not Tax Income of Out-of-State NonGrantor Trusts
The DING Trust is a non-grantor trust, separate and apart from its
settlor for income tax purposes, and therefore independently taxed on
any income and gains it may realize. Thus, DING Trusts are most useful
as a tax mitigation device when sitused in states that do not impose income tax on resident non-grantor trusts.20 Consequently, the threshold
issue for a taxpayer contemplating a DING Trust is whether his or her
state of domicile taxes the accumulated income and capital gains of a
non-grantor trust located in another state. The answer varies by jurisdiction, as each state asserts its own grounds for taxing trusts.
1. State Bases for the Taxation of Trust Income
Generally, there are five bases for state taxation of trusts: (1) if the
trust was created by the will of a testator who lived in the state at
death,21 (2) if the settlor of an inter-vivos trust lived in the state,22 (3) if
the trust is administered in the state,23 (4) if one or more trustees live or
20 “Seven states—Alaska, Florida, Nevada, South Dakota, Texas, Washington, and
Wyoming—do not tax the income of trusts.” Richard Nenno, Planning to Minimize or
Avoid State Income Tax on Trusts, 34 ACTEC L.J. 131, 132 (2008).
21 “Seventeen states—Connecticut, the District of Columbia, Illinois, Louisiana,
Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota (trusts created or first administered in state after
1995), Nebraska, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin—tax a trust created by the Will of a resident. New Jersey and New
York tax on this basis in certain circumstances, and Idaho, Iowa, and Montana tax if this
is one of several factors. Although Delaware, Missouri, and Rhode Island tax if the trust
has at least one resident beneficiary, Arkansas and Massachusetts tax if the trust has at
least one resident trustee. Alabama taxes on this basis if a trust has a resident fiduciary
or current beneficiary.” Id.
22 “Twelve states—the District of Columbia, Illinois, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota
(trusts created or first administered in state after 1995), Nebraska, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin (trusts created or first administered in state after October 28, 1999)—tax an irrevocable trust created by a resident.
New Jersey and New York tax on this basis in certain circumstances, and Connecticut,
Delaware, Michigan, Missouri, Ohio, and Rhode Island tax if the trust has at least one
resident [noncontingent] beneficiary. Massachusetts taxes if the trust has at least one
resident trustee and at least one resident [noncontingent] beneficiary, but Arkansas taxes
if the trust has at least one resident trustee. Idaho and Montana tax if this is one of
several factors; Alabama taxes on this basis if a trust has a resident fiduciary or current
beneficiary.” Id. at 132–33.
23 “Fifteen states—Colorado, Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana (inter-vivos
trusts unless trust designates law of another state), Maryland, Minnesota (trusts created
or first administered in state before 1996), Mississippi, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oregon, South Carolina, Utah (inter vivos trusts only), Virginia, and Wisconsin (inter vivos
trusts created or first administered in state before October 29, 1999)—tax a trust if it is
administered in the state. Idaho, Iowa, and Montana tax on this basis if it is combined
with other factors. Hawaii taxes if the trust has at least one resident beneficiary. Oregon
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do business in the state,24 or (5) if one or more beneficiaries live in the
state.25 In some jurisdictions, a trust might be deemed a tax resident
under more than one of these categories.26 It is also possible for a trust
to be subject to taxation in more than one state.27 Fortunately, trust tax
rules in many jurisdictions, including high-tax states like California,28
provide safe-harbor exemptions and ample planning opportunities for
those seeking to implement a DING Trust.29
provides guidance on whether a corporate trustee is administering a trust in the state.”
Id. at 133.
24 “Eight states—Arizona, California, Georgia, Kentucky, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oregon, and Virginia—tax if one or more trustees reside in the state. Idaho, Iowa
(inter vivos trusts only), and Montana tax on this basis when combined with other factors.
Delaware, Hawaii, and New Hampshire tax on this basis only if the trust has one or more
resident [noncontingent] beneficiaries. Arizona, California, and Oregon provide guidance on whether a corporate trustee is a resident. If some, but not all, of the trustees of
a trust are California residents, California taxes only a portion of the income.” Id.
25 “Five states—California, Georgia, North Carolina, North Dakota, and Tennessee—tax a trust if it has one or more resident [noncontingent] beneficiaries. If a trust is
taxed on this basis, California and Tennessee tax only income attributable to resident
[noncontingent] beneficiaries.” Id.
26 This may occur, for example, when a trust created by the will of a resident is
administered in the state. Richard Nenno, Planning to Minimize or Avoid State Income
Tax on Trusts, 34 ACTEC L.J. 131, 132 (2008).
27 Id.
28 If a trust is administered by a California trustee or has California noncontingent
beneficiaries, regardless of whether its settlor is or was a resident of California, the trust
income will be subject to California income tax. However, only a proportionate share of
the trust’s taxable income from sources outside California will be subject to tax when
there are nonresident co-trustees or nonresident beneficiaries. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE
§§ 17743–17744; 18 CAL. CODE REGS. §§ 17743–17744. Thus, California income tax can
be reduced by appointing co-trustees outside of California. See Charles A. Redd, State
Income Tax Issues With Trusts, NAEPC J. OF EST. & TAX PLAN., 2d Q. 2011, at 1, 7
(2011). It should be noted that, even if a Californian is receiving current income distributions from a trust that has a non-California trustee, the trustee should be able to defer or
avoid California taxation of accumulated ordinary income and capital gains if distribution
of such income and gains is within the trustee’s discretion. See Cal. Franchise Tax Board
Technical Advice Memorandum 2006-0002 (Feb. 17, 2006). Accordingly, a California
beneficiary who is a mere discretionary beneficiary, as in the 2013 PLRs, is categorized,
in California, as a contingent beneficiary. For a state-specific treatment of DING Trusts
in California, see Mathew G. Brown, David L. Keligian, and Gregory E. Lambourne,
California Income Tax Issues for Non-California Trusts, California Trusts and Estates
Quarterly, Volume 19, Issue 4 (2014) and Volume 20, Issue 2 (2014).
29 States that tax trusts based on the tax residence of the trustee, tax residence of the
beneficiary, or any other factor besides the tax residence of the settlor, provide much
more flexibility in changing the residence of the trust for income tax purposes. See Philip
J. Michaels & Laura M. Twomey, How, Why, and When to Transfer the Situs of a Trust,
31 EST. PLN. 28 (Jan. 2004); see also Nenno, supra note 20. Section 605(b)(3)(D)(i) of the
New York State Tax Law provided a safe harbor for certain nonresident trusts; however,
as of March 31, 2014, New York treats DING Trusts as “grantor trusts” for purposes of
the New York income tax. Thus, New York settlors of such trusts will be required to
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Regardless, states that impose an income tax will do so on “source
income” derived directly from in-state assets or activities, without regard for the taxpayer’s residence.30 Thus, after confirming the tax bases
of out-of-state non-grantor trusts, settlors of DING Trusts must also ensure that they fund the trusts with income-producing assets that are not
sourceable to their states of domicile. Notably, most forms of investment income, including gains from the sale of a business31 and ordinary
portfolio income,32 are excepted from state sourcing rules.
The settlor of the trust in PLR 201310002 resided in New Jersey, a
high tax jurisdiction that taxes trust income based on the location of the
trust’s assets and the domicile of its fiduciaries.33 Accordingly, the taxpayer settled the trust using non-sourceable investments and a corporate
trustee in Nevada, where there is no state income tax.34 The settlor also
ensured that there were no other fiduciary ties to New Jersey, such as a
resident investment advisor, which, as noted by counsel to the taxpayer
report all of the trust’s income tax items on his or her individual income tax returns and
will be responsible for the associated income tax liability. N.Y. TAX LAW § 612(b)(41).
30 Redd, supra note 28, at 5–6 (“Generally, states tax resident trusts on all their
world-wide income and tax nonresident trusts only on the income generated from real
property, tangible personal property or business interests within the state, i.e., the
‘source’ income of the nonresident trust. Thus, the planning opportunities available from
changing the tax residency are limited to realized capital gains and accumulated income
that are not considered ‘source’ income.”) (citations omitted).
31 States usually treat gain from the sale of a business interest under their general
rules for taxing income from the sale of an intangible asset; thus, any gains are taxed by
the state where the seller of the interest is domiciled unless the interest had acquired a
situs in a different state. See, e.g., GP Credit Co., LLC v. Orlando Residence, Ltd., 349
F.3d 976 (7th Cir. 2003); In re Lambert, 179 F.3d 281 (5th Cir. 1999); Gordon v. Holly
Woods Acres, Inc., 328 F.2d 253 (6th Cir. 1964). It is important to note, however, that
when a membership interest in a limited liability company is sold, the determination as to
whether the interest acquired a taxable situs in a state other than that of the seller’s
domicile is a fact dependent inquiry that can be difficult to predict. California, for example, is notorious for taking aggressive stances in such matters. See Robert W. Wood,
California Sourcing and M&A, The M&A Tax Report, Volume 21, Number 7 (Feb. 2013)
(discussing California’s bewildering source income rules and related authority as they
pertain to sales of membership interests in limited liability companies).
32 The widely adopted Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act classifies
such income as nonbusiness income, allocated to the individual’s state of residence.
UNIF. DIV. OF INCOME FOR TAX PURPOSES ACT §§ 6(c), 7 (Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs
on Unif. State Laws 1957). See also, e.g., Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Dir., Div. of Taxation, 504
U.S. 768 (1992); Hoechst Celanese Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 22 P.3d 324 (Cal. 2001);
Pledger v. Getty Oil Exploration Co., 831 S.W.2d 121 (Ark. 1992).
33 See Pennoyer v. Tax. Div. Director, 5 N.J. Tax 386 (1983); Potter v. Tax. Div.
Director, 5 N.J. Tax 399 (1983) (holding that a trust cannot be taxed on its income if the
trustees and assets are out of state).
34 See Lipkind & Oshins, Teleconference, supra note 12.

Winter 2013] ELIMINATE STATE TAX ON TRUST INCOME

325

(and discussed below), might have established a tax nexus to the settlor’s state of domicile.35
2. Avoiding Fiduciary Contacts with the Settlor’s State of
Domicile
Settlors of DING Trusts should be mindful of the residence of anyone participating in the trust’s administration, not just the trustee. Indeed, parties with any sort of discretionary authority over the trust,
whether as an investment advisor or member of a distribution committee,36 may be deemed to hold a fiduciary power regardless of their titular designation in the trust instrument.37 This is of paramount
importance in the DING Trust context because revenue officials in
states that base taxation (in whole or in part) on a trustee’s domicile,
New York and California in particular, have been able to maintain a tax
nexus through such non-trustee participants by characterizing them as
fiduciaries under state law.38
35

Id. (noting that the trust’s investment advisor did not reside in New Jersey).
The trust at issue in the 2013 PLRs had an independent corporate trustee, subject
to the direction of a distribution committee and an investment advisor. Id. Though there
was no trust protector named, the discussion of this Section II.A.2 applies in equal measure to any third party non-trustee participant, including trust protectors. See infra note
38 and its accompanying text.
37 The traditional fiduciary functions of a trustee include (1) exercising the important labor-intensive and liability-sensitive discretionary investment management and distribution responsibilities, (2) performing all ministerial administrative responsibilities
necessary to implement those exercises of discretion, (3) preparing fiduciary accountings
and trust tax returns, and (4) otherwise administering trusts in accordance with the governing instruments and applicable state trust law. Unlike this traditional trust model, a
multi-participant or “directed trust” arrangement involves a co-trustee or a non-trustee
fiduciary, typically a “protector” or “advisor,” empowered to direct the trustee holding
legal title to the trust assets to execute the empowered party’s directions concerning the
critical discretionary investment or trust distribution powers or both. The traditional
trustee is thereby relegated to implementing those directions and often performing other
administrative functions such as recordkeeping, maintaining principal and income accounts, and preparing and filing trust tax returns. See Joseph F. McDonald, III, Emerging
Directed Trust Company Model, TR. & EST., Feb. 2012, available at http://wealthmanage
ment.com/?estate-planning/?emerging-directed-trust-company-model.
38 See John P.S. Duncan & Anita M. Sarafa, Achieve the Promise—and Limit the
Risk—of Multi-Participant Trusts, 36 ACTEC L.J. 769 (Spring 2011) (citing King & Tenney v. Cal. State Bd. of Equalization, 2007 Cal. Tax LEXIS 406 (Cal. Oct. 4, 2007) (asserting that a trustee or any other person may be a California fiduciary for tax purposes if
they act in any fiduciary capacity for a trust)); N.Y. State Dept’t Tax’n & Fin., JPMorgan
Chase Bank, Adv. Op., TSB-A-04(7)(I) (Nov. 12, 2004) available at http://www.tax.ny
.gov/?pdf/?advisory_?opinions/?income/?a04_7i.pdf (last accessed Apr. 27, 2011) (asserting that in New York an advisor or committee that directs the trustee on investment,
distribution, or other matters or that has a veto power over the trustee’s actions will be
treated as a co-trustee, thereby subjecting the trust to New York tax if such an advisor or
36
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Fortunately, states with directed trust statutes,39 including all that
have adopted the standard language of the Uniform Trust Code,40 provide that trusts, subject to a few mandatory exclusions,41 can override
state law.42 Consequently, settlors in these states may negate the fiduciary status of non-trustee participants through express language in the
trust instrument.43 In the absence of explicit clarity, either from statute
or from the trust itself, courts generally apply to all trust participants the
duties and liabilities of full trustees or co-trustees, particularly when
powers that are fiduciary in nature are divided or shared among them.44
committee member lives in New York, even if the trustee and all trust property are
outside the state).
39 For a complete list of states with directed trust statutes, see Richard W. Nenno,
Directed Trusts: Making Them Work, TAX MGMT. EST., GIFTS AND TR. J. (2013), at Appendix A, available at https://www.wilmingtontrust.com/?repositories/?wtc_?sitecontent/?
PDF/?Directed_?Trusts_?Article_?03_?13.pdf.
40 UNIF. TRUST CODE §§ 105 (2005). The full text of the Uniform Trust Code is
available at http://www.uniformlaws.org/?shared/?docs/?trust_?code/?utc_?final_?rev
2010.pdf. (last visited Sept. 4, 2013). To determine which states have enacted the Uniform Trust Code, go to http://www.uniformlaws.org/?Act.aspx??title=Trust%20Code (last
visited Sept. 4, 2013).
41 In states adopting the standard Uniform Trust Code language, the statute does
not allow the trust instrument to override the duty of a trustee to act in good faith, the
power of the court to modify compensation of a trustee, limits on exculpatory provisions,
and the rights of the person other than a trustee or beneficiary. UNIF. TRUST CODE
§§ 105(a)(2), (7), (10), (11).
42 Some trust law scholars maintain that fiduciary duties simply are default rules and
that the settlor and trustee can agree by contract to waive them. See, e.g., John H.
Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L.J. 625, 629 (1995)
(arguing that trustees’ fiduciary duties find their origin in contract law); see also Melanie
B. Leslie, Trusting Trustees: Fiduciary Duties and the Limits of Default Rules, 94 GEO.
L.J. 67, 69 (2005) (pointing out that “the default rule paradigm has increasingly influenced doctrine and permeates the recently promulgated Uniform Trust Code . . . .”)
(footnote omitted). Under a contractarian view of trusts, a settlor and trustee could privately agree to modify or waive application of some fiduciary rules. Others, however,
argue against the ability to waive or significantly modify essential trustee duties. Id. at 6970.
43 Trust counsel must determine (a) the exact duties of each trust participant, (b) the
standards that should apply to them, (c) their liability for losses to the trust or its beneficiaries arising from any failure to fulfill an assigned duty, and (d) how the participants
should work together. A recent review of the common law and statutory law on the
subject concluded that the only way to make these determinations with an adequate degree of confidence about the outcome is to specify exactly what is desired in the trust
instrument and make sure those provisions will be governed by the laws of a state that
lets the instrument override contrary state law. See Duncan & Sarafa, supra note 38, at
774.
44 See Duncan & Sarafa, supra note 38, at 785, 801 (citing McLean v. Davis, 283
S.W.3d 786, 794–95 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009) (holding that a trust protector was a fiduciary
due in part to the presence of certain fiduciary “earmarks,” including a reference to “fi-

Winter 2013] ELIMINATE STATE TAX ON TRUST INCOME

327

Accordingly, the settlor in PLR 201310002 was careful to ensure
that the powers of the Distribution Committee were exercisable in a
discriminatory manner for the express benefit of the committee members themselves, and not as a fiduciary for anyone else.45 As such, it
would be difficult, if not altogether impossible, for New Jersey to assert
a fiduciary nexus through the committee members. Indeed, as beneficiaries with non-fiduciary powers of appointment, a more apt characterization of their authority, members of the Distribution Committee were
freed from accountability in exercising their power and, as a result, had
no fiduciary connection with the state regardless of their domicile for
tax purposes.
This was not the case with respect to the trust’s investment advisor,
whose power differed from that of the Distribution Committee because
it was exercisable for the express benefit of others, in this case, the trust
beneficiaries.46 Though the trustee was explicitly relieved of liability for
following the investment advisor’s direction,47 the investment advisor
remained accountable for its decisions and, as a consequence, would be
considered a fiduciary under state law.48 Thus, the settlor in PLR
201310002, as noted above, made sure to designate an out-of-state in-

duciary capacity” in the trust instrument and a formal relationship with the beneficiaries
requiring the protector to act with beneficiaries’ interest in mind)).
45 The trust at issue in the 2013 PLRs was a discretionary trust with no distribution
standards that could be enforced by the beneficiaries. See infra note 98 and its accompanying text.
46 Though not explicit in the 2013 PLRs, counsel to the taxpayer confirmed that
there was an out-of-state investment advisor who was authorized to direct the trustee
with regard to the management of the trust assets. See Lipkind & Oshins, Teleconference,
supra note 12.
47 In a directed trust, such as the one at issue in the 2013 PLRs, the discretionary
authority to invest trust assets need not be held by the trustee. See NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 163.5549. Thus, with a directed trust, the trustee functions more as an administrator or custodian, and can be relieved of liability for following the investment advisor’s
direction with respect to investment-related decisions within the advisor’s scope of authority. Id. Note, however, exculpatory language in a directed trust is not absolute and
generally seems to provide a lower level of protection to the trustee receiving investment
direction. See Duemler v. Wilmington Trust Co., C.A. No. 20033 N.C. (Del. Ch. 2004),
Rollins v. Branch Banking and Trust Company of Virginia, 56 Va. Cir. 147 (Va. Cir. Ct.
2002).) (subjecting the trustee to a reasonableness standard in relying on the advisor,
rather than being liable only if the trustee were guilty of willful misconduct or gross
negligence in relying on the advisor); see also Nenno, supra note 39.
48 Under typical circumstances, an ordinary negligence standard—the investment
adviser must act reasonably—is recommended. In situations in which the investment advisor must deal with difficult assets, such as a minority interest in a business, or litigious
beneficiaries, consideration should be given to protecting the investment adviser from
liability for investment decisions except in cases of willful misconduct or gross negligence.
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vestment advisor so as to avoid any resident fiduciary contacts (and potential tax nexus) with New Jersey.49
B. Settlor Must Not Retain Controls that Trigger Grantor Trust
Status
When a trust is deemed a grantor trust, the trust’s income is taxed
to its settlor and thereby subject to taxation in the settlor’s state of domicile regardless of the trust’s residence for state income tax purposes.50
Taxpayers seeking the benefit of the DING Trust’s advantageous tax
situs must therefore ensure that the trust avoids grantor trust status or
else any potential state tax savings will be lost.51 Accordingly, the settlor of a DING Trust must not possess any of the controls prohibited by
the grantor trust rules of sections 671 through 679 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended (“I.R.C.” or “Code”).
Among the restrictions contained in the grantor trust rules, five
consistently arise in the DING Trust context. First, the settlor cannot
retain a material reversionary interest in the trust.52 Second, the settlor
cannot have the power to control beneficial enjoyment of the trust’s assets without approval of an “adverse party.”53 Third, the settlor cannot
have the power to revoke the trust or revest its assets in himself.54
Fourth, subject to certain exceptions, neither the settlor nor the settlor’s
spouse can receive prohibited distributions of current or accumulated
income from the trust.55 Finally, the trust assets must not be subject to
claims by the settlor’s creditors.56 Each of these prohibitions was addressed by the 2013 PLRs.57
49

See Lipkind & Oshins, Teleconference, supra note 12.
A trust is deemed a grantor trust when a settlor or another person is treated as
the owner of the trust income or principal or both for federal income tax purposes. This
means that the settlor (or such other person) must include in the computation of taxable
income all items of “income, deductions, and credits against tax of the trust” attributable
to the portion of the trust that he or she is deemed to own. I.R.C. § 671. In other words,
the settlor or such other person treated as the owner of the trust is taxed as if he or she
had received the assets directly. Id.; Treas. Reg. § 1.671-2(d) (2000).
51 From the language of the statute, it is not clear that a grantor trust is treated as
being one and the same as the settlor, but that is the longstanding position of the IRS, as
set forth in Rev. Rul. 85-13, 1985-1 C.B. 184.
52 I.R.C. § 673(a).
53 I.R.C. § 674(a).
54 I.R.C. § 676(a).
55 I.R.C. § 677(a).
56 Treas. Reg. § 1.677(a)-1(d) (1971).
57 Though not included among the five common grantor trust triggers, I.R.C. § 675
must always be a consideration for settlors of DING Trusts. It leads to grantor trust
status when administrative control of the trust is exercised primarily for the benefit of the
settlor. This is a question of fact, dependent on the actual management of the trust, not
its operational mechanics. Thus, grantor trust status under I.R.C. § 675 is not addressed
50

Winter 2013] ELIMINATE STATE TAX ON TRUST INCOME

329

1. Retained Reversions Under Code § 673
Code § 673 provides for grantor trust treatment if the settlor of a
trust holds a reversionary interest in income or principal worth more
than 5% of the trust’s value at its inception.58 In prior DING Trust
rulings, a settlor’s eligibility to receive discretionary distributions from
the trust did not qualify as a reversionary interest.59 The IRS ruled consistently in the 2013 PLRs, concluding in accordance with the past rulings, yet without explanation, that the settlor did not possess a
reversionary interest that could trigger grantor trust status.60
Notably, a reversionary interest is not defined by the grantor trust
rules, and because the IRS stance in the PLRs is not elaborated upon,
the precise rationale for determining whether a reversionary interest exists in the DING Trust context is somewhat speculative. However, it is
likely based upon the term’s traditional definition, which identifies a reversion as the interest remaining with the owner of a vested estate upon
transferring a lesser-vested estate to another person.61

by the PLRs but rather by an examining agent upon filing of the applicable federal income tax returns. Trustees must therefore ensure that they follow their fiduciary responsibilities in strict adherence to the language of their trusts. In so doing, grantor trust
status under I.R.C. § 675 should be avoided.
58 I.R.C. § 673(a) provides that the settlor shall be treated as the owner of any portion of a trust in which the settlor has a reversion in either principal or income if, at the
creation of the trust, the value of the reversion exceeds 5% of the value of such portion.
A trust will be considered a grantor trust if the value of a retained interest, whether an
interest in the income or principal, exceeds 5% of the value of the trust property. However, a grantor can be treated as the owner of only a portion of a trust. The value of the
retained interest is determined at the time of the transfer to the trust. The interest rate
prescribed by I.R.C. § 7520 is used to value a retained interest.
59 See, e.g., PLR 200612002 (Nov. 23, 2005); PLR 200502014 (Sept. 17, 2004); PLR
200247013 (Aug. 14, 2002); PLR 200148028 (Aug. 27, 2001).
60 Although the settlor’s spouse may be a discretionary distributee during the lifetime of the settlor, a DING Trust should not provide the surviving spouse with a qualified
terminable interest property (“QTIP”) trust or any other beneficial interest at the settlor’s death. Under I.R.C. § 672(e), the settlor is treated as holding any power or interests held by the settlor’s spouse. Thus, a QTIP trust would likely cause the settlor to be
deemed to possess a reversionary interest that would cause the DING Trust to be a grantor trust under I.R.C. § 673. All is not lost for the settlor’s spouse, however, because the
settlor may retain and exercise a testamentary limited power of appointment in favor of
the spouse either outright or in some type of trust in which the spouse holds an interest,
such as a QTIP trust.
61 E.g. 1 JOHN A. BARRON, JR. & LEWIS MALLALIEU SIMES, THE LAW OF FUTURE
INTERESTS § 82 (3d ed. 2004); 2 HERBERT T. TIFFANY & BASIL JONES, TIFFANY ON REAL
PROPERTY § 311(a) (2010).
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Under this definition, the settlor of a properly drafted DING
Trust62 could not hold a reversion because the settlor presumably would
have transferred his entire legal interest, not a lesser interest, to a third
party trustee. After such a transfer, the settlor becomes a trust beneficiary subject to the trustee’s discretion,63 having an interest in property
that does not amount to legal ownership.64 Support for the argument
that section 673 uses the term in this manner—and thus does not cover a
settlor’s beneficial interest in a DING Trust—can be found in IRS guidance, case law, and legislative history.65
2. Power to Control Beneficial Enjoyment Under Code § 674
Code § 674 generally triggers grantor trust status when trust property is subject to a power of disposition exercisable by a settlor without
“adverse party” approval.66 An adverse party, for these purposes, is
“any person having a substantial beneficial interest in the trust which
would be adversely affected by the exercise or non-exercise of the
power.”67 Under this definition, beneficiaries of the same trust are adverse to each other with respect to any power over the disposition of
trust property, as their respective beneficial interests are diminished
upon an exercise of a dispositive power in favor of anyone other than
62 In a property drafted DING Trust, there are no ascertainable standards for making distributions to the settlor; thus, his or her access to income and principal from the
trust depends upon the non-fiduciary direction of a distribution committee.
63 I.R.C. § 673(c) provides that discretionary powers should be assumed to be exercised to maximize the value in favor of the grantor “in determining whether a reversionary
interest has a value in excess of five percent.” I.R.C. § 673(c) (emphasis added). However, this should not be interpreted to suggest that a discretionary exercise in favor of the
grantor can be assumed to determine whether a reversion actually exists. “Rather, the
assumption is only made in calculating the value of a traditional reversion, relative to the
size of the trust, in applying the five percent exception.” Thomas R. Pulsifer, Taking
Advantage of the “Delaware Advantage”: Why and How to Settle Trusts in Delaware and
Move Trusts to Delaware, MORRIS, NICHOLS, ARSHT & TUNNELL LLP, Apr. 13 2010,
http://www.mnat.com/?assets/?attachments/?208.pdf (concluding that I.R.C. § 673(c)
does not operate to create a reversion where none exists under the traditional definition
contemplated by Congress).
64 Black’s Law Dictionary defines beneficial interest as “[p]rofit, benefit, or advantage resulting from a contract, or the ownership of an estate as distinct from the legal
ownership or control.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 142 (5th ed. 1979) (emphasis added).
65 For a comprehensive treatment of reversionary interests under I.R.C. § 673, see
Pulsifer, supra note 63 (concluding that a settlor’s retained beneficial interest in a DING
Trust does not amount to a reversionary interest).
66 I.R.C. § 674(a) provides, in general, that the settlor shall be treated as the owner
of any portion of a trust for which the beneficial enjoyment of the principal or the income
is subject to a power of disposition exercisable by the settlor or a non-adverse party or
both without the approval or consent of any adverse party.
67 I.R.C. § 672(a).
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themselves.68 The settlor in PLR 201310002 retained three controls that
implicate I.R.C. § 674 prohibitions, namely the Settlor’s Consent Power,
the Settlor’s Sole Power, and the Settlor’s Testamentary Power.
The Settlor’s Consent Power, which allowed the settlor to approve
or disapprove trust distributions directed by the Distribution Committee, avoided triggering grantor trust treatment because the committee
members, each a beneficiary of the trust, were deemed to be adverse to
the settlor under the aforementioned definition.69 The Settlor’s Sole
Power, exercisable by the settlor for the health, education, maintenance,
and support of his descendants, was dismissed as a grantor trust trigger
under an exception to I.R.C. § 674 for powers limited by an ascertainable standard.70 As for the Settlor’s Testamentary Power, it too avoided
I.R.C. § 674 under an exception for powers exercisable by will.71 Thus,
in each instance, the settlor’s retained powers over the trust escaped
grantor trust treatment under I.R.C. § 674.
3. Power to Revoke the Trust and Revest Trust Property Under
Code § 676
Code § 676(a) provides that a settlor of a trust is treated as the
owner, and the trust a grantor trust, if the settlor has the power to revoke it.72 Code § 676(a) also applies if the settlor’s spouse73 or a nonadverse party, or both, have the power to revest title to trust property in
the settlor.74 In PLR 201310002, the trust was irrevocable;75 moreover,
title to the trust property could only be revested in the settlor in conjunction with the Distribution Committee, which, as already noted, was
68 An interest in the trust is substantial if “its value in relation to the total value of
the property subject to the power is not insignificant.” Treas. Reg. § 1.672(a)-1(a) (1960).
Generally an interest of a remainderman is only adverse to the exercise of a power over
principal. Treas. Reg. § 1.672(a)-1(d) (1960). The interest of an ordinary income beneficiary, however, may be adverse to just a power over income but could also be adverse to
a power over principal. Treas. Reg. § 1.672(a)-1(c) (1960). A “non-adverse party” is
anyone who is not an adverse party. Treas. Reg. § 1.672(b)-1 (1960).
69 Each possessed “a substantial beneficial interest in the trust which would be adversely affected by the exercise or non-exercise” of the Settlor’s Consent Power. I.R.C.
§ 672(a).
70 PLR 201310002 (Nov. 7, 2012); I.R.C. § 674(b)(5)(A).
71 I.R.C. § 674(b)(3).
72 See I.R.C. § 676(a).
73 A consequence of I.R.C. § 672(e).
74 I.R.C. § 676(a).
75 The revocability of a trust is a matter of state law. The Uniform Trust Code section 602 creates a presumption that a trust is revocable unless it expressly provides otherwise. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 602 (2005). 7C U.L.A. 546 (2006). This presumption
reverses the common law rule that trusts are presumed irrevocable unless a power to
revoke was reserved at the time of creation. See, e.g., 76 AM. JUR. 2D TRUSTS § 71 (2005).
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comprised of trust beneficiaries who were adverse to the settlor for income tax purposes. As a result, grantor trust status under I.R.C.
§ 676(a) was effectively skirted.
4. Income for the Benefit of the Settlor or Settlor’s Spouse Under
Code § 677
Code § 677 triggers grantor trust status when the income of a trust
may, without adverse party approval, be distributed to the settlor or the
settlor’s spouse or be accumulated for future distribution to the settlor
or the settlor’s spouse. In PLR 201310002, none of these actions could
have occurred without the participation of the Distribution Committee,
which, as explained above, was deemed to be adverse to the settlor for
income tax purposes. Thus, grantor trust status was also avoided under
I.R.C. § 677.
5. Creditor Claims Under Treas. Reg. § 1.677(a)-1(d)
Under Treas. Reg. § 1.677(a)-1(d), a trust is a grantor trust if its
income is applied, or may be applied at the discretion of the settlor or a
non-adverse party or both, to discharge the debts of the settlor or the
settlor’s spouse.76 Traditional common law principles, followed by a
majority of the states, allow a settlor’s creditors to reach assets in trust
to the maximum extent that the trustee of the trust maintains discretion
to make distributions back to the settlor.77 Thus, a self-settled trust, that
is a trust created for the settlor’s own benefit, will be deemed a grantor
trust in most states because the settlor’s beneficial interest could be attached to satisfy the settlor’s debts under the common law rule.78
There are, however, several states with legislation that abrogates
the common law, allowing settlors to establish self-settled asset protection trusts, sometimes referred to as “DAPTs,”79 with spendthrift provi-

76

Treas. Reg. § 1.677(a)-1(d).
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TR., § 58, § 60 cmt. f.
78 Another way of looking at the situation is that the settlor has indirectly retained
the economic access to the trust assets through incurring debts. In the jargon used by the
IRS, the settlor can thereby “relegate” his creditors to the trust assets. Rev. Rul. 76-103,
1976-1 CB 293; Rev. Rul. 77-378, 1977-2 CB 347.
79 Asset protection planning using trusts by settlors in the United States were initially only possible under the laws of offshore or foreign jurisdictions; thus, asset protection trusts settled in the United States are known as Domestic Asset Protection Trusts, or
“DAPTs.”
77
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sions80 that protect trust assets from settlors’ creditors.81 Accordingly,
in such states, absent a fraudulent transfer82 or defect in implementation,83 assets in DAPTs are not subject to attachment by creditors.84
Though not explicit in any ruling, the DING Trusts involved in many of
the decisions issued prior to the 2013 PLRs, were, in fact, settled as
DAPTs;85 thus, the taxpayers’ beneficial interests were afforded spendthrift protection and a concomitant shield from grantor trust treatment
under the regulations.86
Following the release of the 2013 PLRs, however, creditor protection afforded by DAPTs settled by nonresidents of DAPT states has
been subject to increased speculation. In re Huber, a decision of the
Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Washington, relied on Sec80 Black’s Law Dictionary defines a spendthrift provision as “[a] condition in trusts
barring one or more beneficiaries from pledging or spending benefits before they are
received.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1101 (2d ed. 1910).
81 Current DAPT jurisdictions are Nevada, South Dakota, Ohio, Alaska, Delaware,
Tennessee, Rhode Island, New Hampshire, Hawaii, Wyoming, Missouri, Utah, Virginia,
Oklahoma, and Colorado. Among them, only Alaska, Delaware, Nevada, South Dakota,
and Wyoming impose no income tax on trusts. See Nenno, supra note 20.
82 A fraudulent transfer occurs when a debtor intends to hinder, delay, or defraud a
creditor or transfers property to another person without receiving reasonably equivalent
value in return. See UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT §§ 4(a), 5(a).
83 The facts may support an argument that the settlor has, through an implied agreement or other defect in implementation, retained control over the DAPT in a manner
that will allow the court to conclude that the requirements of the DAPT statute have not
been met. Attacks under this category include the following claims: (1) there were implied agreements between the settlor and the fiduciary, (2) the trust was implemented so
that it is merely the “alter-ego” of the settlor, or (3) the trust is a “sham” because of the
manner in which it was implemented. David G. Shaftel & David H. Bundy, Domestic
Asset Protection Trusts Created by Nonresidents Settlors, Estate Planning, (Apr. 2005)
available at http://shaftellaw.com/?docs/?article_?23.pdf (noting three “general avenues
of attack” that a creditor may pursue to reach assets that a settlor has transferred to a
DAPT, including (1) choice of law, (2) fraudulent transfer, and (3) improper
implementation).
84 It is important to note, however, that most DAPT statutes create a class of exception creditors who may be able to attach the settlor’s beneficial interest in the DAPT.
Nevada is currently the only state without any exception creditors. See Gideon Rothschild, Asset Protection Planning—Keeping It All in the Family, 2011 ABATAX-CLE
1022139 (Oct. 22, 2011) (noting that “Nevada is [the] only state which has no exception
creditors”). The exception creditor provisions found in every other state generally take
the form of carveouts for property settlements of divorcing spouses, alimony, child support, and preexisting tort creditors. Id.
85 William D. Lipkind & Steven J. Oshins, New Private Letter Ruling Approves
NING Trust, THE ULTIMATE ESTATE PLANNER, INC., June 21, 2013, http://ultimateestate
planner.com/?lawyer/?New_?Private_?Letter_?Ruling_?Approves_?NING_?Trust_?cp
7987.htm.
86 Treas. Reg. § 1.677(a)-1(d).
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tion 270 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws87 to invalidate
an Alaska DAPT settled by a Washington resident.88 The decision of
the Huber court is considered flawed89 by many commentators because
it ignores Section 541(c)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code, which excludes a
debtor’s interest in a spendthrift trust from the bankruptcy estate if the
trust’s spendthrift provisions are enforceable under applicable state
law.90
To determine which state’s spendthrift law applies—that of the settlor’s home state or that of the DAPT state—Section 273 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws respects the choice expressed by the
settlor in the trust instrument.91 Rather than addressing the enforceability of the trust’s spendthrift provision, however, the Huber court instead focused on the validity of the trust itself, a broader, less definite,
and, arguably contraindicated inquiry,92 requiring the trust to conform
with the public policy of the state with the closest ties.93 The Huber
court found that the trust had its most significant relationship with
Washington, partially based on the debtor’s residence, and concluded,

87

An inter vivos trust of interests in movables is valid if valid under the law of the
state designated by the settlor to govern the validity of the trust, provided that the application of its law does not violate a “strong public policy” of the state with which the trust
has its most significant relationship under the principles stated in § 6 of the Restatement.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 270 (1971).
88 In re Huber, 493 B.R. 798 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2013).
89 See Jonathan D. Blattmachr et al., Avoiding the Adverse Effects of Huber, TR. &
EST., July 2013; see also, Gideon Rothschild & Daniel Rubin, Alaska Asset Protection
Trust Deemed Invalid Under Washington Law, (May 29, 2013) available at http://wealth
management.com/?asset-protection/?alaska-asset-protection-trust-deemed-invalid-underwashington-law.
90 “A restriction on the transfer of a beneficial interest of the debtor in a trust that is
enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law is enforceable in a case under this title.”
11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1).
91 “Whether the interest of a beneficiary of an [inter vivos] trust of movables is
assignable by him and can be reached by his creditors is determined . . . by the local law
of the state, if any, in which the settlor has manifested an intention that the trust is to be
administered, and otherwise by the local law of the state to which the administration of
the trust is most substantially related.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS
§ 273 (1971).
92 “[S]ection 270 is specific to the validity of a trust rather than the efficacy of a
purported restraint on alienation of beneficial trust interests. With regard to the conflict
of laws issue on this latter matter, section 273 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of
Laws is the applicable authority.” Gideon Rothschild et al., Self-Settled Spendthrift
Trusts: Should a Few Bad Apples Spoil the Bunch?, 9 J. Bankr. L. & Prac. 59 (Nov./Dec.
1999).
93 Huber, 493 B.R. 798.
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with little if any substantive analysis,94 that Washington had a “strong
public policy against self-settled asset protection trusts.”95
Despite the ruling in Huber, and even without spendthrift protection, the trust at issue in PLR 201310002 still avoids the prohibitions of
Treas. Reg. § 1.677(a)-1(d).96 As noted above, a trust is self-settled and
therefore subject to attachment under the common law rule to the extent that the trustee must or may make distributions back to the settlor.97 The trust in PLR 201310002 restricted the trustee from making
any distributions to the settlor unless directed by the Distribution Committee, which, as discussed above, was comprised of non-trustee participants who had no fiduciary obligation to make a distribution to the
settlor or otherwise.98 Consequently, the trust at issue in the PLR was
not self-settled and, as such, evades grantor trust status under I.R.C.
§ 677 regardless of whether the trust’s spendthrift protections were
enforceable.99
94 In examining Washington’s public policy on “self-settled asset protection trusts,”
the court’s analysis was seemingly incomplete, failing to acknowledge or consider that
Washington safeguards individual retirement accounts from creditors, an effectively
equivalent form of self-settled spendthrift protection. The Huber court’s public policy
analysis also disregarded other forms of “self-settled asset protection,” such as life insurance, annuities, homesteads, tenancies by the entirety, and section 529 plans. See Robert
T. Danforth, Rethinking the Law of Creditors’ Rights, 53 Hastings L.J. 287, 325, 333–343
(2002) (noting various forms of self-settled spendthrift protection).
95 See Huber, 493 B.R. 798 (citing Wash. Rev. Code § 19.36.020 which voids transfers to self-settled trusts with regard to the settlor’s existing or future creditors).
96 Though the trust in the 2013 PLRs had a spendthrift clause and was valid under
Nevada law, it was not settled as a DAPT.
97 See supra text accompanying notes 78-80.
98 “[A] discretionary beneficiary has no contractual or enforceable right to any income or principal from the trust, and therefore the beneficiary cannot force any action by
the trustee. In re Marriage of Jones, 812 P.2d 1152 (Colo. 1991); G. Bogert, Trusts and
Trustees, Section 228 (2nd ed. 1979). This is because a court may only review a discretionary trust for abuse and bad faith. There is no reasonableness standard of review by a
court with respect to a discretionary trust. Further, the discretionary interest is not assignable. Id. In this respect, a discretionary beneficiary’s interest is generally not classified as a property interest. Rather, it is nothing more than a mere expectancy. U.S. v.
O’Shaughnessy, 517 N.W. 2d 574 (Minn. 1994); In re Marriage of Jones, 812 P.2d 1152
(Colo. 1991). If a beneficiary has no right to force a distribution from a trust, then the
same rule applies to the beneficiary’s creditor. The creditor may not force a distribution.
In this respect, whether the assets of a discretionary trust are protected does not depend
on spendthrift provisions with respect to the current beneficial interest. . . . [T]he asset
protection features of a discretionary trust are much stronger than those of a support
trust or a mandatory distribution trust that must rely on spendthrift protection.” Mark
Merric and Steve J. Oshins, Effect of the UTC on Asset Protection of Spendthrift Trusts,
Estate Planning Magazine, Volume 31, No. 8, (Aug., Sept., & Oct. 2004).
99 Under Treas. Reg. § 1.677(a)-1(d), a trust is a grantor trust if its income is applied,
or may be applied at the discretion of the settlor or a non-adverse party or both, to discharge a legal obligation of the settlor or the settlor’s spouse. Income (and principal)
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C. Settlor’s Transfer of Assets Must Be Wholly Incomplete for Gift
Tax Purposes
Current federal gift tax rates far exceed the highest state income tax
rates. Thus, any potential DING Trust income tax savings would be nullified if a gift tax were assessed upon the trust’s funding. A DING Trust
is, therefore, only effective for tax planning purposes if the settlor’s
transfer of assets to the trust escapes gift tax.
Generally, a gratuitous conveyance of property is subject to gift tax
when there is an irrevocable transfer of an entire interest in the property
such that the transferor has no dominion or control over it.100 Under
the gift tax regulations, this occurs when a transferor can no longer
change the disposition of the property.101 Conversely, if the transferor
retains the power to alter the disposition of the property (and never
relinquishes that power), then the gift is incomplete.102 Accordingly, a
settlor’s ongoing control over a gift in trust can render it incomplete for
gift tax purposes.103
A series of PLRs from 2001 to 2007 affirmed this result in the
DING Trust context, concluding repeatedly that a gift in trust was incomplete due to the settlor’s retention of a testamentary limited power
of appointment, which enabled the settlor to control the disposition of
the trust assets at his or her death.104 To the chagrin of many tax advisors, the IRS revised its stance on the issue with the 2012 release of
from the trust at issue in the ruling was only distributable to the settlor upon the direction
of the Distribution Committee, which was comprised of adverse parties. Accordingly,
there was no way the settlor’s legal obligations could be satisfied without the participation of an adverse party.
100 Sanford’s Estate v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 308 U.S. 39 (1939); see also
Burnet v. Guggenheim, 288 U.S. 280 (1933).
101 Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2(c) (1999) (“A gift is also incomplete if and to the extent
that a reserved power gives the donor the power to name new beneficiaries or to change
the interests of the beneficiaries as between themselves unless the power is a fiduciary
power limited by a fixed or ascertainable standard.”). Section 25.2511-2(b) provides the
general rule as to what is a complete or incomplete gift: “As to any property, or part
thereof or interest therein, of which the donor has so parted with dominion and control
as to leave in him no power to change its disposition, whether for his own benefit or for
the benefit of another, the gift is complete. But if upon a transfer of property (whether in
trust or otherwise) the donor reserves any power over its disposition, the gift may be
wholly incomplete, or may be partially complete and partially incomplete, depending
upon all the facts in the particular case.” Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2(b) (1999).
102 See Id.
103 See Sanford, 308 U.S. 39 (holding that the retention of control over the disposition of trust property, whether for the benefit of the donor or others, renders the gift
incomplete until the power is relinquished).
104 See, e.g., PLR 200647001 (Aug. 7, 2006) (citing Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2(b) (1999)
(stating that if the donor is the discretionary income beneficiary, a retained testamentary
power of appointment causes the transfer to the trust to be an incomplete gift)); PLR
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Chief Counsel Advice Memorandum 2012-08-026 (“CCA”).105 The IRS
therein advanced a more nuanced position, asserting that a gift in trust
subject to a retained testamentary power in the settlor was actually a
transfer in two parts: (1) a current interest that is complete for gift tax
purposes and (2) a remainder interest that is incomplete for gift tax
purposes.106
Citing extensive authority, the IRS explained that the underlying
justification for the refinement in its thinking was that a testamentary
power of appointment can only be exercised if the trust property is not
distributed before the settlor’s death.107 Consequently, for a gift in trust
to be wholly incomplete, as to both its current and remainder interests,
the settlor needs to retain controls over the lifetime and testamentary

200612002 (Nov. 23, 2005); PLR 200637025 (June 5, 2005); PLR 200502014 (Sept. 17,
2004); PLR 200247013 (Aug. 14, 2002); PLR 200148028 (Aug. 27, 2001).
105 I.R.S. Chief Couns. Adv. Mem. 2012-08-026 (Sept. 28, 2011).
106 It is important to note that a Chief Counsel Advice Memorandum such as this is
not “the law” and simply reflects the opinion of the IRS attorney that prepared it. Nevertheless, such memoranda often show how the IRS may consider a particular tax issue in
the event of a taxpayer examination.
107 The CCA concluded that retained testamentary powers of appointment over a
trust under which the grantors were not beneficiaries cause the remainder interest to be
an incomplete gift, but concluded that the testamentary powers of appointment relate
only to the remainder interest. During the grantors’ lifetimes, they had no ability to keep
the trustee from making distributions among the potential trust beneficiaries—which
might potentially include all of the trust assets. Therefore, the CCA reasoned that the
gift was complete as to the “beneficial term interest” that existed before the grantors’
deaths—but was an incomplete gift as to the remainder interest. (Treas. Reg. § 25.25112(b) states that if the donor is the discretionary income beneficiary, a retained testamentary power of appointment causes the transfer to the trust to be an incomplete gift.) The
task then became to determine the relative values of the term interest (a completed gift)
and the remainder interest (an incomplete gift). The CCA reasoned that § 2702 applied,
and because the retained interest (i.e., the interest passing to “applicable family members”) was not a qualified interest, it had to be valued at zero under § 2702. Therefore,
the completed gift of the term interest was the full value transferred to the trust. The
CCA raised concerns that merely reserving a testamentary limited power of appointment
in the grantor may be insufficient by itself to cause the transfer to a DING trust to be an
incomplete gift by the grantor.
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disposition of the trust estate.108 As detailed below, the taxpayer in
PLR 201310002 did just that.109
1. Testamentary Power of Appointment
As with the prior PLRs involving DING Trusts,110 the settlor in
PLR 201310002 retained a testamentary limited power of appointment.
Contrary to those prior PLRs, however, the IRS applied its reasoning
from the CCA and concluded that the Settlor’s Testamentary Power
amounted to “a retention of dominion and control over the remainder”
and was therefore an incomplete gift with respect to the remainder
only.111 Accordingly, the full gift tax effect of the settlor’s transfer
would depend on the nature and extent of the settlor’s other retained
controls, specifically those over the disposition of the trust estate during
the settlor’s lifetime.
2. Lifetime Powers of Appointment
Perhaps mindful of the limitations on retained testamentary powers
articulated in the CCA, the settlor in PLR 201310002 also reserved two
lifetime powers of appointment over the trust, namely, the Settlor’s
Consent Power and the Settlor’s Sole Power.112 As to each power, the
IRS determined that its retention was enough to render the settlor’s gift
“wholly incomplete” as to both the trust’s current and remainder
interests.
108 Sanford, 308 U.S. at 43–44 (“[R]etention of control over the disposition of the
trust property, whether for the benefit of the donor or others, renders the gift incomplete
until the power is relinquished whether in life or at death.”); see also Diana S.C. Zeydel,
When is a Gift to a Trust Complete—Did CCA 201208026 Get It Right?, 117 J. TAX. 142
(2012); Steve Akers, Favorable “DING Trust” Letter Rulings; Confirmation of IRS’s Position that Settlor’s Retention of Testamentary Power of Appointment Does Not Necessarily Cause Full Transfer to Trust to Be Incomplete Gift, AM. C. OF TR. & EST. COUNS.,
June 24, 2013, http://www.actec.org/?public/?Akers_?Favorable_?DING_?Trust_?PLRs_
?Musings.asp.
109 PLR 201310002 and its companion rulings affirm the reasoning of the CCA, supporting its conclusion that the retention of a testamentary power causes the transfer of
property to the trust to be incomplete “with respect to the remainder” for federal gift tax
purposes and, accordingly, complete as to the term interest prior to the termination of
the trust without a retained lifetime power over it. PLR 201310002 (Nov. 7, 2012); PLR
201310003 (Nov. 7, 2012); PLR 201310004 (Nov. 7, 2012); PLR 201310005 (Nov. 7, 2012);
PLR 201310006 (Nov. 7, 2012).
110 See, e.g., PLR 200928013 (Mar. 12, 2009); PLR 200744020 (June 8, 2007); PLR
200712008 (Oct. 26, 2006); PLR 200449006 (Aug. 11, 2004); PLR 199936004 (May 7,
1999).
111 PLR 201310002 (Nov. 7, 2012).
112 Id.
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a. Settlor’s Consent Power
The Settlor’s Consent Power, which authorized distributions of income and principal from the trust, could only be exercised by a majority
of the Distribution Committee with the consent of the settlor. The IRS
concluded that the interests of the Distribution Committee members
with respect to the exercise of the power were not substantially adverse
to the settlor’s interest in the exercise of the power.113 Consequently,
the trust’s income and principal, which comprised the entire trust estate,
remained under the settlor’s dominion and control for gift tax
purposes.114
The irony, of course, is that the IRS had already determined in the
same ruling that the interests of the Distribution Committee members,
each a beneficiary of the trust, were adverse to those of the settlor, albeit for income tax purposes.115 The apparent inconsistency in treatment on this point arises from differences in the way adversity is
determined for income and gift tax purposes.116 The IRS posits and
summarily dismisses two ostensibly applicable definitions in the gift tax
context, both of which are found in Treas. Reg. § 25.2514-3(b)(2).
The first provides that a “taker in default of appointment under a
power has an interest that is adverse to an exercise of the power.”117
The trust at issue in PLR 201310002 was distributable among the settlor’s descendants upon the settlor’s death; thus, the settlor’s sons, as
descendants and presumed trust remaindermen, would seem to qualify
as takers in default. The IRS disagreed, without explanation, leading
one prominent commentator to speculate that the status of the sons as
takers in default of the Settlor’s Consent Power was not assured.118
Indeed, by refusing to consent to proposed distributions, the settlor
could force accumulations in the trust that would ultimately be subject
113 Treasury Regulations provide that a donor is considered as himself having a
power if it is exercisable by him in conjunction with any person not having a substantial
adverse interest in the disposition of the transferred property or the income therefrom.
Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2(e) (1999).
114 PLR 201310002 (Nov. 7, 2012) (stating that the settlor is “considered as possessing the power to distribute income and principal to any beneficiary himself because he
retained the Grantor’s Consent Power”).
115 See Zeydel, supra note 108 (citing numerous regulatory discrepancies between
income, gift, and estate tax treatments of powers of appointment).
116 Section 25.2511-2(e) does not define “substantial adverse interest.” Treas. Reg.
§ 25.2511-2(e) (1999).
117 Treas. Reg. § 25.2514-3(b)(2) (1997).
118 Akers, supra note 108 (“The ruling gives no explanation as to why the four sons
are not deemed to be ‘takers in default’ if a distribution is not made. Perhaps it is because of Grantor’s retained testamentary limited power of appointment, so that none of
the four sons could be assured of receiving any undistributed trust assets.”).
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to the Settlor’s Testamentary Power, a control he held exclusively and
could exercise to divert the entire trust estate away from the sons or any
trust remaindermen. Accordingly, the sons would more aptly be characterized as “takers in default” of the Settlor’s Testamentary Power rather
than of the Settlor’s Consent Power, as their interest in the trust property upon the non-exercise of the Settlor’s Consent Power was completely uncertain.
There was no IRS elaboration on this point, and the ruling hastily
jettisons its analysis to a second definition of adversity, premised upon
the status of the Distribution Committee members as “coholders” with
the settlor of the Settlor’s Consent Power.119 In this capacity, the sons
would be deemed adverse to the settlor if they were to succeed to the
settlor’s authority to exercise the power.120 In other words, the sons
needed to inherit the settlor’s power to consent to distributions in order
to be adverse to him for gift tax purposes.
This was not a possibility under the terms of the trust as the Distribution Committee was set to terminate at the settlor’s death.121 Thus,
the ruling concludes that the sons, as committee members, were not adverse to the settlor with respect to the exercise of the Settlor’s Consent
Power because they would be unable to exercise any committee power,
let alone a power held jointly with the settlor, if the settlor were to
die.122 As such, they failed to meet the adversity required of
“coholders” under the applicable regulations.
b. Settlor’s Sole Power
The Settlor’s Sole Power gave the settlor exclusive authority to
make trust distributions for the health, education, maintenance, and
support of his descendants.123 Though the power was exercisable in a
non-fiduciary manner, it precluded the settlor from making distributions
for his own benefit and limited distributions to trust principal only, not
income.124 Despite such constraints on its exercise, the IRS determined
that the settlor’s retention of the Settlor’s Sole Power was also enough
119

PLR 201310002 (Nov. 7, 2012).
“A co-holder of the power has no adverse interest merely because of his joint
possession of the power nor merely because he is a permissible appointee under a power.
However, a co-holder of a power is considered as having an adverse interest where he
may possess the power after the possessor’s death and may exercise it at that time in
favor of himself, his estate, his creditors, or the creditors of his estate.” Treas. Reg.
§ 25.2514-3(b)(2) (1997).
121 PLR 201310002 (Nov. 7, 2012).
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 Id.
120
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to make his transfer of property to the trust “wholly incomplete” for gift
tax purposes.125
As with the ruling’s other determinations, the IRS provides scant
analysis to support its position, citing Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2(c) for the
proposition that a gift is incomplete “if and to the extent that a reserved
power gives the donor the power to name new beneficiaries or to
change the interests of the beneficiaries.”126 A review of the full text of
the regulation reveals more language to parse, including a subsequent
exception for “fiduciary power[s] limited by a fixed or ascertainable
standard.”127 The Settlor’s Sole Power, as noted above, is subject to an
ascertainable standard,128 but it is also exercisable in a non-fiduciary
manner;129 thus, it presumably avoids the exception and the gift remains
incomplete. The IRS determination is therefore sound on this point despite the ruling’s failure to emphasize, or even mention, the importance
of the non-fiduciary nature of the retained power.
Also absent from the ruling is an explanation of why the Settlor’s
Sole Power, which only applies to trust principal, was enough to render
both current and remainder interests incomplete. Though such a power
could certainly make the transfer incomplete as to trust principal, since
it applies to principal, it is unclear how the power is applicable to trust
income.130 It is also uncertain whether the inclusion of the Settlor’s Sole
125

Id.
Id.
127 “A gift is . . . incomplete if and to the extent that a reserved power gives the
donor the power to . . . change the interests of the beneficiaries as between themselves
unless the power is a fiduciary power limited by a fixed or ascertainable standard.” Treas.
Reg. § 25.2511-2(c) (1999).
128 That means a “clearly measurable standard under which the holder of a power is
legally accountable.” Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(g)(2) (1997). Examples of fixed or ascertainable standards include “for the education, support, maintenance, or health of the beneficiary; for his reasonable support and comfort; to enable him to maintain his
accustomed standard of living; or to meet an emergency.” Id. Non-fixed or non-ascertainable standards include “pleasure, desire, or happiness of a beneficiary.” Id. If a
power is limited by a reasonably fixed or ascertainable standard, the powerholder can be
compelled to exercise his or her discretion in accordance with that standard.
129 “Interestingly, the IRS treats whether a grantor holds a substitution power in a
non-fiduciary capacity for purposes of section 675(4)(C) as a question of fact to be determined in each year for income tax purposes. The IRS gave no analysis of whether the
Grantor actually held the power in a non-fiduciary capacity as a factual matter.” Akers,
supra note 108.
130 Perhaps the IRS reasoned that if the settlor exercised the Settlor’s Sole Power to
exhaust the trust of principal, there would be little if any income remaining, an impact
that would be felt by the trust’s current and remainder beneficiaries. Additionally, under
the terms of the trust, any undistributed income was to be accumulated and added to
principal. Thus, trust income could in fact be converted to principal and, thereby, ultimately subject to the Settlor’s Sole Power. PLR 201310002 (Nov. 7, 2012).
126
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Power is even necessary, as it seems reasonable to conclude that the
Settlor’s Consent Power alone, as discussed above, would suffice to
cause the transfers to the trust to be wholly incomplete for gift tax
purposes.131
Based on his discussions with the IRS, the attorney who secured
PLR 201310002 asserts that the taxpayer at issue would not have received the ruling without the Settlor’s Sole Power.132 Counsel therefore
cautions any taxpayer seeking similar results to include the same settlor
controls. To heed this admonishment, DING Trusts must be established
in DAPT jurisdictions that permit settlors to retain lifetime powers of
appointment. Alaska,133 Delaware,134 Nevada,135 Ohio,136 South Dakota,137 and Wyoming138 appear to be the only jurisdictions in which
this is possible,139 and, among them, only Alaska, Nevada, South Dakota, and Wyoming have no income tax on resident trusts.
D. Distribution Committee Members Must Not Hold General
Powers of Appointment
A general power of appointment includes any power exercisable in
favor of its holder, the holder’s estate, the holder’s creditors, or the
creditors of the holder’s estate.140 Property subject to such a power can
be included in the holder’s taxable estate at death;141 and a lifetime release or exercise of the power would itself be considered a taxable trans131 See Morris, Nichols, Arsht & Tunnell Tr., Est. and Tax Group, PLR 201310002
and Its Implications For DING Trusts, MORRIS, NICHOLS, ARSHT & TUNNELL LLP, Mar.
30, 2013, http://www.mnat.com/?assets/?htmldocuments/?MorrisNichols_?TrustEstates
TaxGroup_?AlertPLR_?March%202013.pdf.
132 Lipkind & Oshins, Teleconference, supra note 12 (spoken by William D. Lipkind,
concerning the utility of including both the Settlor’s Consent Power and the Settlor’s Sole
Power).
133 ALASKA STAT. § 34.40.110(b)(2).
134 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3570(11)b.
135 NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 166.040.
136 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5816.05.
137 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 55-16-2(2)(b).
138 WYO. STAT. ANN. § 4-10-510(a)(iv)(B).
139 But see Robert L. Moshman, Return of the DING Trusts: With William D.
Lipkind, Steven J. Oshins, and Jonathan G. Blattmachr, THE ESTATE ANALYST, 3, Apr.
2013, http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/?files/?return-of-ding-trusts.pdf (stating that common law applicable to all states could allow the same retained power without exposing
trust assets to creditors); see also Delaware Qualified Dispositions in Trust Act, DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 12, §§ 3570(11)b.2, 3571 (2011) (prohibiting a settlor’s retention of a lifetime power of appointment in order for a self-settled trust to be protected from claims of
the settlor’s creditors).
140 A general power of appointment is defined in the same way for gift tax purposes
under I.R.C. § 2514 and for estate tax purpose under I.R.C. § 2041(a)(2).
141 I.R.C. § 2041(a)(2).
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fer.142 Accordingly, DING Trusts must not contain committee controls
that could be characterized as general powers of appointment; otherwise, any assets subject to such controls would be included in the estates
of the committee members at their respective deaths143 and taxed as
gifts if distributed during their lifetimes.144
A 2007 IRS News Release (“IRS Release”) questioned whether
DING Trust committee members, by virtue of their ability to direct trust
income and principal among themselves, possessed general powers of
appointment.145 Though the IRS Release was refuted by many prominent members of the estate planning bar,146 it nonetheless caused DING
Trusts to fall out of favor among those who feared unintended estate
and gift tax liabilities attendant with their use.147 The 2013 PLRs laid
these concerns to rest, citing two statutory exceptions to the definition
of a general power of appointment under which the Distribution Committee powers were effectively vindicated.
1. Statutory Exceptions Under Code §§ 2514(c)(3)(A) and (B)
The first exception, under I.R.C. § 2514(c)(3)(A), applies to powers
that the holder can only exercise in conjunction with the person who
142

I.R.C. § 2514(b).
I.R.C. § 2041(a)(2).
144 Id.
145 I.R.S. News Release IR-2007-127 (July 9, 2007) (questioning whether their DING
Trust rulings were consistent with Rev. Rul. 76-503, 1976-2 C.B. 275 and Rev. Rul. 77158, 1977-1 C.B. 285 which indicate that “because the committee members are replaced if
they resign or die, they would be treated as possessing general powers of appointment”).
146 The ABA Real Property, Trust and Estate Law Section submitted written comments to the IRS in 2007. Letter from the Am. Bar Ass’n Real Prop., Tr. & Est. L. Sec.
to the IRS, Incomplete Gift Response (Sept. 26, 2007), available at http://www.american
bar.org/?content/?dam/?aba/?publications/?rpte_ereport/?2007/?october/?comments_?on
_?private_?letter_?rulings.authcheckdam.pdf. The authors of the comments conclude
that the applicable PLRs are not inconsistent with Revenue Rulings 76-503 and 77-158,
citing various distinctions and asserting that the joint power-holders in the DING rulings
have more adversity to each other than do the joint power-holders in the revenue rulings.
They also point out that the regulation at issue does not necessarily require succession to
a power on the power-holder’s death to create adversity; it merely gives that as an additional way that a joint power-holder can be deemed to be adverse if his only interest in
the trust is as a co-holder of a power. In addition, they reason that no one can have a
general power of appointment over property the transfer of which is incomplete, addressing a revenue ruling, a case, and several PLRs that are arguably inconsistent with that
proposition.
147 Many intrepid taxpayers continued to establish DING Trusts, incorporating modifications suggested by comments to the IRS Release. Morris, Nichols, Arsht & Tunnell
Tr., Est. and Tax Group, supra note 131.
143
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created the power.148 As already noted, members of the Distribution
Committee in PLR 201310002 could direct trust distributions among
themselves in two ways: (1) by exercising the Settlor’s Consent Power,
which required the settlor’s approval, or (2) by exercising the Unanimous Member Power, which did not. The IRS concluded that the Settlor’s Consent Power fit within I.R.C. § 2514(c)(3)(A), as it could only
be exercised in conjunction with the settlor, the power’s creator. Accordingly, the Settlor’s Consent Power could not be deemed a general
power of appointment.
Exercise of the Unanimous Member Power, on the other hand, did
not require the settlor; thus, it did not fit within the first exception. It
was therefore evaluated pursuant to the second exception, found in
I.R.C. § 2514(c)(3)(B), which exempts from the definition of a general
power of appointment any jointly-held powers subject to an adverse interest upon exercise.149 Adversity, for these purposes, arises under the
applicable regulations when joint holders succeed to each other’s interest in the power and can continue to exercise it in their own favor after
the death of a fellow power-holder.150
Stated differently, and within the context of the 2013 PLRs, an adverse interest under I.R.C. § 2514(c)(3)(B) is present with respect to the
Unanimous Member Power when a member of the Distribution Committee dies and leaves his ability to exercise the power to the remaining
members. The surviving members are adverse to the deceased committee member because they inherit the deceased’s power to direct a distribution of trust property, a right that enhances their own interest because
it provides them with a greater say over how and when a distribution is
made. The IRS attempted to illustrate the conceptual benefits of this
survival right in PLR 201310002 by citing the following example from
the regulations:
[I]f X, Y, and Z held a power jointly to appoint among a group
of persons which includes themselves and if on the death of X
the power will pass to Y and Z jointly, then Y and Z are considered to have interests adverse to the exercise of the power
in favor of X. Similarly, if on Y’s death the power will pass to
148 I.R.C. § 2514(c)(3)(A) provides that a power is not deemed a general power of
appointment for gift tax purposes if the possessor of the power can only exercise it in
conjunction with the person who created it.
149 “A co-holder of the power has no adverse interest merely because of his joint
possession of the power nor merely because he is a permissible appointee under a power.
However, a co-holder of a power is considered as having an adverse interest where he
may possess the power after the possessor’s death and may exercise it at that time in
favor of himself, his estate, his creditors, or the creditors of his estate.” Treas. Reg.
§ 25.2514-3(b)(2).
150 Id.
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Z, Z is considered to have an interest adverse to the exercise of
the power in favor of Y.151
In this illustration, Y and Z are adverse to X because on X’s death,
Y and Z have the opportunity to benefit economically. Adversity
thereby arises when committee members, as joint holders of a power,
can financially gain at the expense of each other by increasing their ability to influence the exercise of that power in their own favor.152 Conversely, joint holders of a power are not adverse to each other when a
holder’s share of the power is passed to a third party upon that holder’s
death. In other words, there is no adversity for the remaining committee members when a third party succeeds to a deceased committee
member’s position because the remaining committee members retain
the same proportion of power to distribute the trust assets to themselves
that they had before their fellow committee member’s death.
Though confirmed by counsel to the taxpayer in the ruling, the fact
that the sons were not automatically replaced on the committee at death
was not explicit in the PLR;153 however, it was this fact that fit the ruling
within the exception illustrated by the example.154 Thus, without the
possibility of increasing power posed by the right of survival, there
would have been no adversity among the initial members of the Distribution Committee, and their interests in the exercise or non-exercise of
the Unanimous Member Power presumably would have been deemed
general powers of appointment.155 Stated differently, the Distribution
Committee members were adverse to each other with respect to the
Unanimous Member Power because they were able to inherit each
other’s ability to exercise the power.156
151 PLR 201310002 (Nov. 7, 2012) (citing an example set forth in Treas. Reg.
§ 25.2514-3(b)(2)).
152 See Treas. Reg. § 25.2514-3(b)(2).
153 Lipkind, DING Redux, supra note 19 (confirming that members of the Distribution Committee were not replaced at death unless and until the committee was reduced
to two members).
154 See PLR 201310002 (Nov. 7, 2012) (citing an example set forth in Treas. Reg.
§ 25.2514-3(b)(2)).
155 The taxpayers in the 2013 PLRs did not request a determination as to whether the
Distribution Committee, when reduced to two members and subject to automatic replacement, would be deemed to hold general powers of appointment; thus, the 2013
PLRs are silent with regard to the issue. Presumably, however, if outgoing members of a
DING Trust committee of any size were automatically replaced, under the logic of the
IRS Release, and the authority cited therein, they would be deemed to possess general
powers of appointment. See generally, Lipkind, DING Redux, supra note 19.
156 Vacancies on the Distribution Committee were not filled until the committee
dwindled to two members. The 2013 PLRs did not address the tax treatment of the
Unanimous Member Power in this situation.
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Accordingly, neither the Settlor’s Consent Power nor the Unanimous Member Power could be a taxable general power of appointment
as both were specifically excepted from its statutory definition. As a
result, any trust property contributed by the settlor to a DING Trust
presumably remains within the settlor’s taxable estate, as opposed to
becoming a part of the estates of the committee members, since the trust
property was initially subject to an incomplete transfer by the settlor for
gift tax purposes.157 Though logic seemingly dictates this outcome,
there is no authority for it other than the 2013 PLRs, which went on to
conclude that any subsequent distribution to a trust beneficiary would
complete the settlor’s original transfer to the trust unless the distribution were made back to the settlor, in which case it would be considered
a non-taxable return of property which had never left the settlor’s dominion and control.158
2. The Shrinking Committee Dilemma
Under the reasoning of the 2013 PLRs, as explained above, so long
as outgoing members of the Distribution Committee were not automatically replaced and the committee was allowed to decrease in size, holders of the Unanimous Member Power would be deemed adverse with
respect to an exercise of the power.159 This “shrinking committee”
structure, which follows the example set forth in I.R.C. § 2514(c)(3)(B),
prevents the Unanimous Member Power from meeting the definition of
a general power of appointment. Under the facts of the 2013 PLRs,
however, if the Distribution Committee were to dwindle to two members, not counting the settlor, the trust required an automatic replacement of outgoing committee members in order to maintain a twomember minimum.
In such circumstances, the Distribution Committee would no longer
meet the “shrinking committee” requirement and the Unanimous Member Power presumably would be deemed a general power of appointment. DING Trust committees that fall to two members under such
facts, thereby face a transfer tax dilemma, as any subsequent actions
with a bearing upon the power, including the expansion or termination
of the committee itself, could be considered an exercise or release sub157 A “fundamental precept of gift and estate taxation” is that “no one may be
deemed to have a general power until the transfer that creates the power is complete for
gift and estate tax purposes.” See Letter from the Am. Bar Ass’n Real Prop. Tr. & Est. L.
Sec. to the IRS, supra note 146 (distinguishing Rev. Rul. 67-370, 1967-1 C.B. 324; Johnstone v. Comm’r, 76 F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1935); PLR 200101012 (Sept. 30, 2000); PLR
200210051 (Dec. 10, 2001); PLR 200403094 (Sept. 24, 2003); and PLR 200604028 (Sept.
30, 2005)).
158 See supra note 103.
159 See Treas. Reg. § 25.2514-3(b)(2).
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ject to taxation.160 Though there is no authority on point, as the 2013
PLRs left this scenario unaddressed, there are essentially two alternatives that can prevent or alleviate the potential tax triggered by the
Unanimous Member Power.
The first option requires the settlor to vest committee members
with the authority to appoint successor members. Assuming there are
additional trust beneficiaries who are eligible to serve, the committee’s
self-perpetuation through such a power could be accomplished by the
agreement of the remaining committee members, with or without the
settlor’s consent, to prevent the committee from reaching its two-member minimum, thereby preempting the conversion of the Unanimous
Member Power into a general power of appointment. Accordingly, the
power to fill vacancies should be exercised while the committee has
three or more members serving, or else the Service could argue that the
appointment of a new member constitutes a taxable release.161
The second option, which would apply if there were no additional
trust beneficiaries eligible to serve on the committee, requires the trust
to be collapsed by having its assets distributed back to the settlor.162
Under the 2013 PLRs, there would be no gift tax consequences with this
option because, as noted above, the IRS determined that a distribution
to the settlor would be considered a return of property that had never
left the settlor’s dominion and control.163 Other than the 2013 PLRs,
however, there is no binding precedent for this stance;164 thus, a settlor
seeking to rely on it must secure a similar determination from the IRS.
Even without a ruling, it is unlikely that the IRS would litigate the
gift tax consequences of a return distribution of trust property to a settlor who, for gift and estate tax purposes, never parted with ownership
of it.165 Indeed, such an argument in the DING Trust context would
160 Under I.R.C. § 2514(b), the release of a general power of appointment is a taxable transfer. Thus, if Distribution Committee members are deemed to hold a general
power of appointment, any subsequent action that relieves them of the power could be
deemed a release that would be subject to gift tax.
161 IRC § 2514(b) (“The exercise or release of a general power of appointment created after October 21, 1942, shall be deemed a transfer of property by the individual
possessing such power.”) (emphasis added).
162 The settlor could use the returned assets to settle a new DING Trust with an
expanded class of beneficiaries who would be eligible to serve on a new committee.
163 See supra note 103.
164 I.R.C. § 6110(j)(3).
165 “We think the conclusion reached in the PLRs that no member of the Distribution Committee holds a general power of appoint also is correct because we think that no
one may be deemed to have a general power until the transfer of the property subject to
the power is complete for gift or estate tax purposes. We think this is a fundamental
precept of gift and estate taxation.” Letter from the Am. Bar Ass’n Real Prop. Tr. & Est.
L. Sec. to the IRS, supra note 146.
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also require the IRS to maintain that distributions to beneficiaries, other
than the settlor, simultaneously constitute a taxable gift of the same
property to the same person at the same time by both the settlor and the
members of the Distribution Committee.166 This seems untenable and
arguably contravenes the logical dictates of gift and estate taxation167
and related IRS authority.168
III. SUMMARY
The 2013 PLRs affirm the viability of DING Trusts as an option for
those seeking to manage income tax liability at state and local levels.
Though PLRs cannot be cited as precedent,169 when the facts of a PLR
are substantially similar to one’s own circumstances, it is reasonable
from a practical perspective to rely upon the ruling as a means of assessing IRS sentiment on the issues presented. Thus, based upon applicable
PLRs, which include those dating back to 2001, taxpayers seeking the
benefits of a DING Trust must be mindful of the following factual bases
for success:
1. Threshold Jurisdictional Considerations:
166 Todd Flubacher & Scott D. Goodwin, Dinged, But Not Dented, TR. & EST., July
2013 (noting the “anomalous and unprecedented results” of such an argument as summarized by the Delaware Bankers Association and the Delaware State Bar Association in
response to the 2007 IRS Release (citation omitted)).
167 See supra note 165.
168 “We think that an exercise in favor of the grantor by either or both members of
the Distribution Committee should not be treated as a gift by either of them. We believe
this conclusion is supported by Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2(f) which specifies that no completed gift occurs with respect to property subject to the taxpayer’s power of amendment
unless it is distributed to a person “other than the donor.” We do not believe Rev. Rul.
67-370, discussed below, forecloses such a construction of Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2(f) because in that revenue ruling, and unlike the situations in the PLRs, the grantor was not a
permissible recipient of the property involved, a circumstance required by the regulation
to avoid a completed gift. We recognize that [Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2(f)] may be read as
determining only whether the grantor would be deemed to make a gift if the property
were distributed to the grantor. But, in our view, it suggests that no one would be deemed
to have made a gift by the distribution to the grantor of property with respect to which
the grantor’s gift was incomplete. We also believe that the regulation implies that, because the grantor/donor would be treated as making a competed gift upon the distribution of trust property to someone other than the grantor, no one else could be treated as
making a completed gift by virtue of such a distribution. Nevertheless, we acknowledge
that one item of published guidance (Rev. Rul. 67-370), one case (Johnstone) and four
private letters rulings (PLRs 200101012, 200210051, 200403094, 200604028) might be
viewed as inconsistent with our view. But correctly analyzed, they are not, in our judgment, inconsistent.” Letter from the Am. Bar Ass’n Real Prop. Tr. & Est. L. Sec. to the
IRS, supra note 146.
169 I.R.C. § 6110(j)(3).
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a. The settlor must not reside in a jurisdiction that taxes the accumulated income and capital gains of an out-of-state non-grantor
trust;170 and
b. The trust must be settled in a no-tax state using low-basis assets, or a portfolio of investments, that would not be considered source
income by the settlor’s state of domicile.171
2. To Prevent Grantor Trust Status:
a. The trust must be irrevocable172 and its income must be protected from the debts and legal obligations of the settlor and the settlor’s spouse;173 and
b. A committee of beneficiaries,174 excluding the settlor and the
settlor’s spouse, must be empowered to direct the trustee to make distributions of income and principal among themselves, the settlor, and, if
desired, the settlor’s spouse.175
3. To Avoid Gift Tax Upon Funding:
a. The settlor must retain a lifetime power to consent to distributions of income and principal among beneficiaries, including the settlor and settlor’s spouse, as directed by the committee;176
b. The settlor must retain a lifetime power to appoint principal
among beneficiaries other than the settlor, but only if it is exercisable in
a non-fiduciary manner and subject to an ascertainable standard;177 and
c. Though not required, the settlor may also retain a limited testamentary power of appointment in order to control the disposition of
the trust assets at death.178
170

See supra Section II.
See supra Section II.A.1.
172 See supra Section II.B.
173 See supra Section II.B.
174 If a minor is appointed to the distribution committee, then a guardian may be
appointed to act on the minor’s behalf. This was established in March of 2014, when the
IRS released ten PLRs approving a particular incomplete gift non-grantor trust that involved the appointment of guardians to act on behalf of minors seated on the trust’s
distribution committee. PLR 201410001 (Oct. 21, 2013); PLR 201410002 (Oct. 21, 2013);
PLR 201410003 (Oct. 21, 2013); PLR 201410004 (Oct. 21, 2013); PLR 201410005 (Oct. 21,
2013); PLR 201410006 (Oct. 21, 2013); PLR 201410007 (Oct. 21, 2013); PLR 201410008
(Oct. 21, 2013); PLR 201410009 (Oct. 21, 2013); PLR 201410010 (Oct. 21, 2013).
175 See supra Sections II.B.
176 See supra Section II.C.2.a.
177 See supra Section II.C.2.b.
178 See supra Section II.C.1.
171

350

ACTEC LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 39:317

4. To Prevent Committee Members From Holding General Powers
of Appointment:
a. There should be at least three beneficiaries on the committee
in addition to the settlor who may also serve but is not required;179
b. The committee should terminate at the settlor’s death or if
there are ever fewer than two members, neither of whom may be the
settlor or the settlor’s spouse;180
c. The committee members should be able to name additional
trust beneficiaries to the committee by unanimous agreement, with or
without the consent of the settlor;181 and
d. Committee members who die, resign, or otherwise cease to
serve should not be automatically replaced; however, remaining members must promptly fill committee vacancies to prevent the committee
from reaching its two-member minimum.182
If these structural safeguards are kept and a DING Trust is effectively implemented, its benefits can be significant. As an irrevocable
spendthrift trust subject to a purely discretionary standard, the DING
Trust can be used to protect assets from potential future creditor claims,
including those arising from divorce, alimony, child support, and
torts.183 These protections are enhanced, if not altogether eclipsed, by
the trust’s prospective state and local tax savings.
Example:
A New Jersey taxpayer, already in the top tax brackets,
anticipates $20 million in long-term gains from the sale of his
stock in a family-owned business. He has other assets that
maintain his current lifestyle; thus, he would only need access
to the sales proceeds in an emergency. He is divorced with
179 Theoretically, the committee could consist of a single member if that member met
adversity requirements for income tax purposes; however, a committee of one would
effectively hold a general power of appointment for gift and estate tax purposes. Consequently, a single member could abscond with the entire trust estate. Moreover, the creditors of a single member would have potential access to the assets of the trust. Due to
these concerns, a multi-member committee is preferred. In the example set forth by the
IRS in the 2013 PLRs, there were three members, a committee that fit squarely within
the proscriptions of Treas. Reg. § 25.2514-3(b)(2). Accordingly, a multi-member committee of at least three trust beneficiaries would appear to be ideal. See also supra Section
II.D.1.
180 See supra note 60.
181 See supra Section II.D.2.
182 See Id.
183 See supra Section II.B. 5.
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three adult children, all liability-prone professionals with modest incomes. Having been sued before, the taxpayer is fearful
of future lawsuits, as well as of another divorce if he were to
remarry.
Under these circumstances, the DING Trust would be an
appropriate solution. The taxpayer and his children can receive discretionary distributions from the trust, subject to the
direction of a committee on which they could each be seated.
While in trust, the assets will be protected from each beneficiary’s subsequent creditors, including divorcing spouses and tort
claimants.184
As for the tax consequences, the following table summarizes the results of an outright sale by the taxpayer versus a
sale by a DING Trust settled in Nevada.185
Without
With
DING Trust DING Trust
Gain from Sale

$20,000,000

$20,000,000

20% Federal Capital Gains Tax186

($4,000,000)

($4,000,000)

($760,000)

($760,000)

8.97% New Jersey State Income Tax188

($1,794,000)

$0

After-Tax Proceeds189

$13,446,000

$15,240,000

$0

$1,794,000

3.8% Medicare Surtax187

Tax Savings

184 The purported protections of a DAPT for assets contributed to it are effective
after the requisite statute of limitations has been met. In Nevada, DAPT assets are protected from future creditors after the greater of two years from the date of transfer to the
trust or six months from the date the creditor discovered or should have discovered the
transfer to the trust with respect to preexisting creditors. See Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 166.010166.170.
185 The after-tax totals in the table are simple calculations based on the referenced
rates of taxation. The table is for illustrative purposes only and does not account for the
interaction between such taxes for purposes of deduction on federal, state, and local tax
returns.
186 See supra note 1.
187 See supra note 2.
188 New Jersey treats capital gains as ordinary income, so the top tax rate on capital
gains is 8.97%. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54A:2-1(b)(5).
189 This is before accounting for any local tax. Such tax would represent additional
tax savings attained through using a DING trust.
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Federal tax on the gains would be about the same in the trust
as it would be if the taxpayer owned the assets outright;190
however, the trust, as a Nevada tax resident, will escape New
Jersey state and local taxes, creating a savings of at least
$1,794,000 upon the sale.191 If those after-tax proceeds were
then invested (and New Jersey source income were avoided),
the effective rate of tax on the trust’s subsequent investment
income would be 23.8%, in contrast to 30.4% in the hands of
the taxpayer.192 Thus, not only would the trust yield more in
the year of the sale, it could serve as a tax-advantaged investment vehicle throughout its duration, providing the taxpayer
and his family with asset protection and significantly more
value by the end of its term.
IV. CONCLUSION
The DING Trust has obvious appeal to taxpayers facing state level
taxation on sizeable income-producing securities portfolios and those
who anticipate a sale of highly appreciated low basis assets, such as an
interest in a closely held business. Thanks to the 2013 PLRs, advisors
may now recommend the DING Trust with greater confidence in its tax
consequences; however, for added certainty, taxpayers who implement a
DING Trust should be encouraged to request their own private letter
190

Pursuant to I.R.C. § 1015(b), a trust’s basis in any property transferred to it by its
settlor is the same as the settlor’s basis in that property, increased in the amount of gain
or decreased in the amount of loss recognized by the settlor upon the transfer. With a
DING Trust, no gain or loss is recognized upon funding because the trust is settled gratuitously, albeit incomplete for gift tax purposes; thus, carryover basis applies. Under I.R.C.
§ 1223(2), the holding period of each capital asset transferred includes the holding period
of the asset as held by the settlor immediately before the transfer. Accordingly, the settlor’s basis, under I.R.C. § 1015(b), and holding period, under I.R.C. § 1223(2), in any
capital assets should carryover to the DING Trust.
191 For 2013, the 20% long-term capital gains rate applies when trust taxable income
exceeds $11,950. I.R.C. § 1(h)(1)(D); ATRA, Pub. L. No. 112-240, 126 Stat. 2313 (2013);
Rev. Rul. 2013-15, I.R.B 2013-5, 444. Compare this with the tax situation of an individual, in which the same income tax bracket kicks in at $400,000 of taxable income
($450,000 for married couples filing jointly). Thus, when planning with a DING Trust,
advisors must weigh the balance of the state tax savings against the federal tax resulting
from the income being taxed to the trust as opposed to an individual, especially given
compressed trust rate brackets and the 3.8% Medicare Surtax. This can be remedied, in
part, by drafting the trust with flexibility to enable the trustee to make distributions to
beneficiaries in lower income tax brackets to minimize both federal and state income
taxation.
192 See Pomerleau, supra note 3 (citing the “marginal effective tax rate” for residents
of New Jersey which accounts for the combination of federal, state, and local taxes, as
well as deductions at each level).
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rulings. By securing a PLR, the taxpayer is assured that any ruled-upon
positions taken on a tax return will be upheld.
An IRS ruling will also reduce the chance that a transaction involving a DING Trust will be challenged in future IRS audits. Even though
PLRs are not binding at the state level, the DING Trust’s state tax benefits effectively ride on its federal tax status;193 and because the IRS has
no revenue stake in the underlying state tax consequences, a favorable
advance ruling on the issues presented by a DING Trust is more likely
with federal tax authorities than with state level counterparts. Thus, in
the DING Trust context, PLRs are the preferred means of protecting a
taxpayer’s interests.194
Of course, there is no protection for overly aggressive taxpayers
who may seek to abuse the DING Trust. Accordingly, settlors should be
cautioned to avoid funding such trusts with assets required for daily living195 or those that are likely to be sold shortly after the trust is settled,
especially if negotiations for the sale are completed before the trust is
set up. A distribution of all, or a significant portion, of the trust assets
back to the settlor after such a sale is equally suspect and should also be
discouraged.196
In addition to creating a risk of challenge as a sham or step transaction for tax purposes, evidence suggesting that the settlor prearranged a
return distribution of trust property could jeopardize the trust’s creditor
protections, which, as already noted, would trigger grantor trust status
193 With respect to grantor trusts, states’ income tax laws generally conform to the
federal definitions of income. Redd, supra note 29, at 1; Virginia F. Coleman, Update on
Planning with Grantor Trusts, 55 TUL. L. SCH. ANN. INST. ON FED. TAX’N 9-1, 9-9 (2007);
William Forsberg, State Income Tax of Trusts Holding Business Interests, AM. BAR ASS’N,
5, Oct. 21, 2011, http://www.americanbar.org/?content/?dam/?aba/?events/?taxation/?tax
iq-fall11-steinert-trusts-paper.?authcheckdam.pdf. States similarly follow the federal
classification of entities in most cases. As a result, trust income that is taxable to the
grantor for federal purposes will generally be taxed to the grantor for state purposes as
well. This is effectively the rule in all states that tax trusts with the exceptions of Pennsylvania and Tennessee, which do not follow the federal grantor trust rules at all, and the
District of Columbia and Louisiana, which tax the grantor only in limited circumstances.
See Nenno, supra note 20.
194 A backup to the PLR is a formal tax opinion letter. Though the taxpayer will still
be responsible for any taxes owed, an opinion letter may help the taxpayer avoid possible
fraud or underpayment charges as well as the burden of any related penalties and fees.
195 When a gratuitous transfer of assets is made, whether outright or in trust, and the
transferor does not retain enough to pay existing and foreseeable creditors, a fraudulent
transfer has occurred and it may be undone. Thus, candidacy for a DING Trust requires
an existing and foreseeable surplus of assets over liabilities. Anyone who has—or is
about to incur—a large obligation and wants to hide assets to avoid paying it, should be
disqualified from consideration and appropriately admonished.
196 Advisors should generally recommend that the trust be created with the intent to
continue it for the lifetime of the settlor.
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and subject the trust’s income to taxation in the settlor’s state of domicile.197 As a consequence, the settlor would be deprived of the DING
Trust’s most desired benefits and could be subject to penalties and additional fees to boot. Thus, as with any tax or creditor protection strategy,
DING Trusts must be implemented under the supervision of knowledgeable counsel.
As detailed throughout this article, there are varying state laws and
nuanced technical requirements impacting the DING Trust. Accordingly, each of its provisions needs careful analysis to ensure not only that
the trust complies with the applicable legal authority but also that it
comports with the client’s overall intent, taking into account the practical considerations involved in the drafting of any estate planning document. Assuming the settlor implements the DING Trust under
circumstances that withstand due diligence, the DING Trust can be a
powerful technique for reducing or eliminating state and local income
tax exposure.

197

See supra Section II.B.5.

